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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------------------
MELVIN H. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAJ."ULA CORPORATION OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER DAY SAINTS, a cor-
poration sole, and JOHN 
TINKER and GENEVIEVE L. 
TINKER, his wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 14806 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from a judgment in favor of 
respondent relative to a sale of property on contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant moved the lower court for a summary 
judgment, which was denied. Thereafter, respondents' 
Complaint and appellant's Counterclaim were tried without 
a jury before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock on June 17, 
1976, at which time the lower court held in favor of res-
pendent on the issue of breach of contract and attorney's 
fees, limited respondents' claim for damages to OclE DOLLAR 
($1.00), and denied appellant's Counterclaim. 
* * * * * * 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court 
decision and further seeks the granting of appellant's 
Counterclaim. In the alternative, appellant seeks modi-
fication of the judgment on the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November l, 1965, appellant and respondent 
entered into a contract for the sale of property belonging 
to appellant located in Manila, Utah. The property des-
cribed in the contract, shown as being one huncired feet 
oy one hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.), was mat 
property to which appellant held record title on the date 
of the contract. Prior to November 1, 1965, there had 
been an exchange of Quitclaim Deeds between appellant and 
defendants TINKER which cleared up certain boundary 
problems but which did not change the size of the property 
to which appellant held record title. 
After the signing of the con tract on i~ovember 
1, 1965, respondent took possession of the property and 
immediately began plans for the erection of tourist 
acco:m.'llodations on the premises. For this purpose he 
prepared certain drawings. (Tr. 36) (For purpose of the 
trial the drawings were marked as Exhibit 2.) The only 
part of the plans completed was the remodeling of the 
building already on the premises. (Tr. 24.) 
* * * 
* * * 
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Respondent was very slow in making any payments, 
beginning with the payment due a year after the contract 
was signed (Defendant'.s Request for Admissions, Ex. F). 
All of the subsequent payments were late (Defendant's 
Request for Admissions, Ex. G, H, I, L, and T) and the 
final payment was never paid to appellant but was tendered 
into court at the time of the filing of the 
complaint. Prior to any legal action by respondent, 
appellant served proper notices on respondent requiring 
him to vacate the premises, which respondent failed to do. 
Respondent then brought action in the lower court against 
appellant and other defendants. The claim directed 
against appellant was that the contract should be reformed 
to show the property covered by the contract to include 
all the property within certain fence lines, which included 
property to which appellant had no record title. 
On December 15, 1975, appellant moved the court 
for summary judgment, based largely on the parol evidence 
rule. Oral argi.:.ment was heard and the motion was denied. 
Thereafter the case was tried without a jury. 
Judgment was en~ered in the lower court ordering 
appellant to convey to respondent by warranty deed all 
the property in question, including property belonging 
to def~ndant TINKERS. In addition the court awarded res-
pondent ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) in damages, attorney's fees, 
and costs. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PAROL EVIDENCE IS BARRED IF THE DESCRIPTION OF 
THE PROPERTY TO BE CONVEYED IS DEFINITE, CERTAIN, AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The law in Utah is clear that where there is 
no ambiguity in the document conveying property regarding 
the description of the premises to be conveyed, "extrinsic 
evidence cannot be introduced to show that it was the 
intention of the granter to convey a different tract or 
that he did not intend to convey all of the land described." 
Percival vs. Cooper, 525 P. 2d 41 (Utah 1974). 
Applying that test to the facts in question, it 
is immediately apparent that there was no ambiguity in the 
description of the property to be conveyed. Not only was 
the description of the property exactly one hundred feet 
by one hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.), but it 
also showed an exact starting point and ending point. 
In fact, the contract exactly described all of the property 
to which the appellant had record title in the immediate 
area. There fore, it was error on the part of the lower 
court to deny appellant's motion for sununary judgment 
since the case, as it stood before the court at the time 
of the motion, showed the respondent not entitled to any 
more property than that specifically described in the 
contract. 
-4-
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POINT TWO 
REFORMATION OF A CONTRACT CAN OCCUR ONLY WHERE 
THERE IS MUTUAL MISTAKE OR WHERE THERE IS FRAUD. 
Even admitting for sake of argument that the 
lower court had a right to allow parol evidence to be 
admitted for the purpose of determining whether the con-
tract in question could be reformed, there was no evi-
dence which would permit reformation. The law is quite 
clear that reformation can only occur, if at all, where 
there is mutual mistake or where there is mistake on one 
side and fraud on the other. Powell on Real Property, 
Vol. 6, ,!903; Simmons Creek Coal Company vs. Duran, 142 
U.S. 417, 12 Sup. Ct. 239, 335 L. Ed. 1063; Janke vs. 
Beckstead, 8 Utah 2d 247, 332 P. 2d 933 (1958). The lower 
court found no evidence of fraud on behalf of appeliant. 
Therefore, the only question is whether the evidence 
showed that there was mutual mistake as to the property 
to be included in the sale by appellant to respondent. 
It is true that there was a little bit of con-
fusion regarding the exact property belonging to the 
appellant prior to the execution of the contract in ques-
tion. Nevertheless, the testimony is clear that prior to 
the signing of the contract on November 1, 1965, the 
appellant had clarified its title to its property by 
exchanging Quitclaim Deeds with defendants TINKER. (Tr. 75.) 
Moreover, at no time did appellant's corporation sole or 
-5-
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any of its representatives ever intend on selling more 
property than was owned by appellant in this particular 
area. In fact the testimony of the corpora ti on sole was 
that at the time of the sale he looked up the deed on the 
property before even posting a "for sale" sign and deter-
mined, based on the measurements on the ground, that 
appellant owned a third of an acre. (Tr. 73.) One hundrec 
feet by one hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.) equals 
fifteen thousand (15,000) square feet, or a little more 
than one-third acre. If the property had included every-
thing within the fence lines, as contended by respondent, 
the property would have been closer to one-half acre. 
The corporation sole further testified he told the realtor 
with whom the property was listed that a survey would 
have to be taken to establish the property boundaries. 
(Tr. 73.} Obviously, there would be no need for a survey 
if the property included everything within the fence lines 
as alleged by the respondents. 
The corporation sole's testimony is clear that 
he knew there was no more than a third of an acre to be 
sold. (Tr. 7 4.) The real tor also knew that the sale 
involved a third acre of land and he prepared the earnest 
money receipt which describes the property as "approx. 
1/3. acre." (Tr . 3 7 , 6 3 . ) d t intend The appellant coul no 
to sell more property than it owned. Hence, there 
was no mistake by the appellant as to the property 
-6-
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it was selling. Moreover, it would have been a simple 
thing for respondent to verify the property description 
before signing the purchase agreement. Therefore, there 
was no basis to attempt reformation of the contract in 
question. 
POINT THREE 
RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF LACHES AND THEREFORE 
CAl.~OT SEEK EQUITABLE ACTION. 
At the outset of the trial, counsel for appellant 
asked for and was granted an amendment to appellant's 
answer in order to allege the affirmative defense of laches. 
This amendment was granted by the court without obj~ction 
of the opposing counsel. (Tr. 6.) 
Since the respondents' claim sounds in equity, 
appellant is free to assert the defense of laches. 27 
Am Jur 2d, Equity, §152 et. seq. It is clear that the res-
pondent is not the ordinary purchaser of property but 
rather a developer of land. (Tr. 14, 16, 43;) · Testimony 
is that shortly after the signing of the contract on 
November 1, 1965, respondent personally measured the 
property in order to determine how best to improve the 
property in question. (Tr. 36.) Those measurements, 
as shown on Exhibit 2, indicate dimensions of one hundred 
twenty-nine feet by one hundred twenty-three feet ( 129 ft. 
x 123 ft.). The critical dimension is that of the frontage 
Which the respondent shows as being one hundred twenty-nine 
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feet (129 ft.) and which in the contract is only one 
hundred feet (100 ft.) . Respondent claims he made no 
measurements of the property prior to actually acquiring 
property by contract but there is no question that the 
measurements of the property shortly after the date of 
the contract put the respondent on notice that there was 
some problem with the property he thought he was receiving. 
In addition, respondent testified that when he placed a 
trailer on the South thirty-two feet (S. 32 ft.) of the 
property, defendant TINKER informed him that that property 
did not belong to respondent but rather to defendant 
TINKER and that respondent was to have his trailer moved. 
This occurred in approximately 1968 as testified to by 
respondent. (Tr. 24-25.) Appellant had to constantly 
remind respondent to make payments and yet nothing was 
ever mentioned to ?PPellant by the way of any problem 
until 1969. (Tr. 2 8.) Nevertheless, even knowing that 
there was a problem in 1968 and certainly by 1969, 
appellant took no action to bring any lawsuit until 1975 
at a time after he had received the second notice from 
appellant evicting him from the property in question. 
The testimony is therefore clear that respondent was most 
dilatory in trying to resolve the problem. He could have 
and should have made appellant aware of his confusion 
· ing 
as to the boundaries of the property prior to the sign 
of the contract on November l, 1965. 
-8-
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have done something no later than approximately 1966 
or early 1967. Certainly the respondent knew of the 
problem or should have known of the problem long before 
any money had been invested in the remodeling of the 
old church. His failure to act promptly should now be 
the basis upon which this Court denies any recovery. 
POINT FOUR 
IN THE ALTERl~ATIVE, APPELLANT SHOULD ONLY HAVE 
TO QUITCLAIM PROPERTY TO WHICH IT DOES NOT HAVE TITLE. 
In the Court's mell¥)randurn decision, it found 
that defendant TINKER was not a bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice and that his interest in the property 
in question "is inferior to the plaintiffs." There was 
nothing in the memorandum decision which indicated that 
appellant became fee title holder to any property other 
than that to which it had record title. Therefore, the 
judgment that the appellant "convey by good and sufficient 
warranty deed the real property described in the last 
preceding paragraph, free and clear of all encumbrances," 
is an unfair and inproper burden upon appellant. Appel-
lant has never received fee title to the property and can 
do nothing more than quitclaim the property in dispute 
to respondent. In the event this Court should find that 
respondent is entitled to have from appellant sone deed 
of conveyance of the property to which defendants TINKER 
holds title, then the j udgrnen t of the lower court should 
-9-
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be modified to reflect that as to that property to 
which it does not hold title, appellant need only give 
a Quitclaim Deed and the title insurance need only 
cover that property to which it holds title. 
POINT FIVE 
UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, RESPONDENT IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
It was respondent's failure to make timely 
payment that brought about the need for appellant to 
serve an eviction notice and declare a forfeiture. 
Respondent had every opportunity to make all the neces-
sary payments and then bring action for title to any 
additional property he thought he had right to have. 
His own failure to make appropriate payment was the 
default which caused the difficulty. As a consequence, 
because of that breach, respondent is not entitled to 
attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has on numerous occasions upheld 
a vendor's right to terminate a contract upon its breach 
by the purchaser and to declare a forfeiture of that prop;:· 
See, e.g., Jensen vs. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485, P. 20 
673 (l9 7l) • The respondent in this action gave ample 
justification to appellant to declare such a forfeiture. 
The terms of the contract, including the property des-
cription and payment dates, were very clear. Respondent ' 
-10-
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was experienced in the field of real estate and fully 
knew the consequences of non-payment. This Court should 
therefore remand this case back to the lower court and 
order it to deny respondent's Complaint and to grant 
appellant's Counterclaim. In the alternative, this 
court should deny respondent attorney fees and should 
require that as to property to which appellant has no 
record title it be required only to quitclaim such 
property to respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTO~N, McCONK:;_ ~YLE 
Jo ep st 
A tor Appellant 
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